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This paper investigates the effect of fiscal equalization on the efficiency properties of 
corporate income tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a Nash tax competition game 
under the taxation principles of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. Fiscal 
equalization ensures efficiency if the marginal transfer just reflects the fiscal and pecuniary 
externalities of tax rates. In contrast to previous studies, tax base equalization (Representative 
Tax System) does not satisfy this condition, but combining tax revenue and private income 
equalization does, regardless of which taxation principle is implemented. Under Formula 
Apportionment, tax base equalization is superior to tax revenue equalization if the wage 
income externality is sufficiently large. 
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Corporate income of multinational enterprises (MNEs) can basically taxed according
to two dierent principles. The principle of Separate Accounting states that corporate
income of each subsidiary of a MNE is taxed separately by the host country's tax code.
Under the principle of Formula Apportionment, in contrast, corporate income of all
subsidiaries is rst consolidated and then assigned to the taxing countries according to
a formula that usually contains the MNE's capital, payroll and sales shares in the re-
spective countries. Separate Accounting is applied in corporate income taxation at the
international level, while some countries like the US, Canada, Germany and Switzer-
land use Formula Apportionment in taxing rms that operate in several jurisdictions
at the national level. Recently, the European Commission (2001, 2007a, 2007b) pro-
posed to replace Separate Accounting by Formula Apportionment within the borders
of the European Union. This proposal has led to a heated debate among politicians
and researchers on the relative merits of the two taxation principles.
This paper shows that, from a tax competition point of view, it does not matter
whether MNEs are taxed according to Separate Accounting or Formula Apportionment,
provided the group of countries in which the MNEs operate has implemented the right
scal equalization system. We employ a multi-country tax competition model with
scal equalization among countries. In this model, each country hosts a subsidiary
of a representative MNE that produces an output with mobile capital and immobile
labor. Wage rates and the interest rate are endogenously determined on local labor
markets and the capital market. Corporate income of the MNE is taxed according to
Separate Accounting or Formula Apportionment. The MNE may reduce tax payments
by shifting prots between countries. Each country is populated by a representative
household that earns factor income from inelastically supplying capital and labor and
prot income from owning a share of the MNE. The household's utility is determined by
the consumption of a private good and a public good. The public good is provided by
the local government which nances its expenditures by the revenues from the corporate
tax. In addition, countries receive or pay transfers within a scal equalization system.
The transfers depend on the corporate tax rates chosen by the countries.
With the help of this model we investigate the eect of scal equalization on the
eciency properties of corporate tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a non-
cooperative (Nash) tax competition game. For both taxation principles we rst identify
the scal and pecuniary externalities caused by changes in tax rates. Fiscal externali-
1ties show how the tax rate of one country inuences tax revenues in the other countries.
Pecuniary externalities describe the eect of one country's tax rate on private income
(capital, wage and prot income) in the other countries. In the absence of scal equal-
ization, both types of externalities are external to the country's choice of tax rates in
a non-cooperative setting and, thus, we can show that they determine the deviation
of the non-cooperative tax rates from their Pareto-ecient (cooperative) levels. As a
benchmark result we then show that under both Separate Accounting and Formula
Apportionment the scal equalization system can be used as a Pigouvian instrument:
if the marginal transfer of a country, that is the impact of this country's tax rate on its
transfer, just reects all externalities, then the country internalizes the external eects
of its tax policy and the non-cooperative tax rates become Pareto-ecient.
Against the background of this benchmark result, we derive three main insights by
investigating which type of equalization system satises the Pigouvian internalization
requirement. The rst main result is that under both taxation principles the so-called
Representative Tax System (RTS), which basically aims at equalizing tax capacities
among countries, does not ensure eciency of the non-cooperative tax rates. Under
Separate Accounting the intuition is that tax base equalization ignores the pecuniary
externalities as it is targeted on the public budget only. Moreover, the RTS fails to fully
internalize the scal externalities. The reason is that a reduction in one country's tax
rate reduces the worldwide tax base, since the interest rate goes up. Hence, tax base
equalization takes away the increase in the tax base of the tax-reducing country, but this
is not enough to compensate the other countries for their reduction in tax bases. Under
Formula Apportionment, the story is almost the same except for the reason why scal
externalities are not fully internalized. For given and symmetric distribution shares of
the consolidated tax base, the fall in the worldwide tax base implies that the average
tax base falls to the same extent as the part of the consolidated tax base assigned to
the tax-reducing country. Hence, this part of the tax-reducing country's change in tax
revenues in not redistributed by tax base equalization.
Our second main result shows that non-cooperative tax rates become ecient if tax
base equalization is replaced by tax revenue equalization and augmented by private
income equalization. This result, too, holds under both Separate Accounting and For-
mula Apportionment. The rationale is as follows. Tax revenue equalization actually
aggravates the incomplete internalization of scal externalities, since there is now a di-
rect negative eect of a tax rate reduction in one country on this country's tax revenues
and on average tax revenues. Due to averaging, the latter eect is absolutely smaller
2than the former, so tax revenues redistributed to the other countries fall in comparison
to tax base equalization. However, equalizing the households' private income is also
not perfect, since it internalizes only a part of the pecuniary externalities. A tax rate
reduction in one country leads to the same reduction in capital and prot income in all
countries. Hence, private income equalization balances only changes in wage income
and thereby reects only that part of the pecuniary externalities that pertains to wage
income (wage income externality), but not those parts that pertain to capital and prot
income (capital and prot income externalities). Interestingly, we can show that these
deciencies of tax revenue and private income equalization just oset each other, so a
combined system renders non-cooperative tax rates ecient.
The third main result is that under Formula Apportionment the RTS is superior to
tax revenue equalization, if the wage income externality is suciently large. The latter
condition is satised, for example, if the apportionment formula uses payroll only. The
net eect of tax revenue equalization is that it does not internalize the wage income
externality. This externality is positive and points to ineciently low tax rates. As
argued above, the degree of internalization is lower under tax revenue equalization than
under the RTS. This dierence is reected by an additional distortion under RTS that
points into the other direction than the wage income externality. Hence, if the wage
income externality is large enough, tax rates under the RTS are still ineciently low,
but closer to the ecient tax rates than under tax revenue equalization.
Our results have several policy implications. Perhaps most important, the second
result may help to mitigate the public debate about the right taxation principle in
Europe. It implies that it does not matter whether MNEs are taxed according to
Separate Accounting or Formula Apportionment if there is equalization of national
income (i.e. private income plus tax revenues). Even though the European Union
does not have an explicit equalization system, a part of the EU budget is nanced by
contributions that are proportional to the national income of the member states (e.g.
Fenge and Wrede, 2007). We would not conclude that the implied income redistribution
is already enough to ensure eciency of corporate income taxation, since the EU budget
is not an equalization system in the sense of our analysis. But the very existence of
income redistribution in Europe might indicate that reforming the member states'
contributions to the budget in a suitable way may politically easier to achieve than
replacing a whole corporate tax system. With the same caution, a similar argument
can be made with respect to corporate income taxation in US states that follows
Formula Apportionment. In the US there is no equalization system either, but it is
3well known that federal taxes and transfers redistribute national income across states
(e.g. Bayoumi and Masson, 1995, M elitz and Zumer, 2002).
The results also have policy implications for corporate taxation and scal equaliza-
tion in Canada and Germany. The Canadian provinces levy a corporate income tax
that follows Formula Apportionment (Martens-Weiner, 2005), and there is an equal-
ization scheme that equalizes tax bases of the provinces (Boadway, 2004; Smart, 2007).
A similar institutional setting is implemented among municipalities in Germany at the
local level (Buettner, 2006; Egger et al., 2007). Our rst two main results imply that
tax base equalization in Canada and Germany is not the ecient equalization system,
since it is dominated by national income equalization. If comprehensive equalization
of national income is viewed as politically infeasible, then the Canadian and German
cases may be evaluated with the help of our third result. Corporate income taxation
of German municipalities uses a pure payroll apportionment formula. Hence, our third
result shows that the implemented tax base equalization is superior to the alternative
of tax revenue equalization. In Canada, however, apportionment uses payroll and sales
with equal weights, so we will show that it is not clear whether the RTS is still superior
or whether eciency gains can be realized by switching to tax revenue equalization.1
Our analysis is related to the literature on the relative merits of Separate Accounting
and Formula Apportionment (e.g. Gordon and Wilson, 1986; Nielsen et al., 2003;
Eggert and Schjelderup, 2003; Sorensen, 2004; Wellisch, 2004; Pethig and Wagener,
2007; Pinto, 2007; Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008, 2009; Nielsen
et al., 2009). But in contrast to our analysis, none of these papers take into account
scal equalization.2 Without distinguishing dierent taxation principles, several studies
discuss the implications of scal equalization for capital tax competition. The seminal
paper is Wildasin (1989). Recent contributions are, for example, Dahlby and Warren
1Equalization at the state level in Germany ('L andernanzausgleich') represents an example for
tax revenue equalization (Baretti et al., 2002; K othenb urger, 2002). Many state taxes use a common
tax rate. This would actually imply that tax revenue equalization turns into tax base equalization.
But the states are responsible for tax enforcement and so determine the eective tax rates. Hence,
we really have tax revenue equalization at the state level in Germany (St owhase and Traxler, 2005).
2There is a paper by Traxler and Reutter (2008) on Formula Apportionment and scal equalization.
But they model Formula Apportionment as a means to redistribute tax revenues and compare the
resulting eects on the countries' tax enforcement policy with those of scal equalization. In contrast
to our paper, they do not address the question how scal equalization can be used to internalize
externalities of corporate tax rates under Formula Apportionment and Separate Accounting.
4(2003), Buettner (2006), Smart (2007) and Egger et al. (2007).3 Our analysis is closest
to DePater and Myers (1994), K othenb urger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006).
Under the conditions of our analysis, i.e. symmetric countries and xed capital supply,
these authors show that the RTS ensures eciency of non-cooperative tax rates.4 The
dierence to our results is due to the dierent modeling of corporate taxation. While
we consider a tax on corporate income, dened as the dierence between sales and
deductible factor costs, previous studies assume a unit (wealth) tax on capital. Hence,
in their framework there is no interest eect on the worldwide tax base, which is one of
the driving forces behind our results.5 Moreover, with symmetric countries and xed
capital supply, pecuniary externalities sum up to zero in previous studies, whereas a
non-zero sum of pecuniary externalities is another driving force of our results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework. In
Section 3 and Section 4 we examine tax competition and scal equalization under
Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Framework
Consider an economy consisting of n  2 identical countries. There is a large number
of MNEs with subsidaries in each country. We suppose all MNEs are identical and,
without loss of generality, focus on the representative MNE. In country i the MNE
produces a (numeraire) good with the help of ki units of the mobile input capital and `i
units of the immobile input labor. The production function reads F(ki;`i). It exhibits
positive and decreasing marginal returns with respect to the two inputs, i.e. Fk > 0,
Fkk < 0, F` > 0 and F`` < 0. Furthermore, the cross derivative of the production
function satises Fk` = F`k > 0, so increasing the quantity of one input raises the
marginal return to the other input. The production function is homogeneous of degree
m 2]0;1[, i.e. F(ki;`i) = mF(ki;`i) for all  > 0. Assuming m 2]0;1[ means that
we have decreasing returns to scale. Hence, there is a xed third production factor like
3There is also a literature discussing incentive eects of scal equalization in the presence of labor
mobility, in contrast to capital mobility. A survey is given in Boadway (2004).
4For the case of asymmetric countries and/or an endogenous capital supply (savings), these studies
also come to the conclusion that a pure RTS does not ensure eciency.
5In an extension, Smart (1998) discusses a (pure) prot tax. However, in his approach the tax
rate is always 100% and he does not explicitly account for capital mobility and dierent taxation
principles. More important, and related to this, in his model the worldwide (and average) prot tax
base is exogenously given, so he too does not obtain the results derived by our analysis.
5e.g. land or entrepreneurial services that gives rise to positive economic rents.6
The MNE may shift prots between its subsidiaries by, for example, manipulating
transfer prices of intermediate goods and services or by reallocating overhead costs
(Devereux, 2006). In an abstract way, prot shifting can be modeled by introducing
the variable si. If si < 0, the MNE shifts prots from the subsidiary in country i to the
subsidiaries in the other countries. For si > 0, prots are shifted to the subsidiary in
country i. Prot shifting has to satisfy
Pn
j=1 sj = 0. This condition ensures that prot
shifting does not inuence the MNE's overall prots. Prot shifting is not costless to
the MNE since, e.g., the MNE has to pay tax consultants or may face the risk of being
detected and penalized when its prot shifting strategy violates tax law. We assume
that the concealment costs of the subsidiary in country i are represented by C(si).
This function is supposed to satisfy C(0) = 0, sgnfC0(si)g = sgnfsig and C00(si) > 0
for all si. That means, concealment costs are U-shaped with a minimum at the point
where the MNE does not shift prots. Note that our modeling implicity assumes that
prot shifting between two subsidiaries is associated with concealment costs in both
subsidiaries. Though we think that this is a realistic assumption, since each country
has its own tax rules that the MNE has to satisfy, all our results would qualitatively
remain true when we assume concealment costs to accrue only once.
In most tax systems, labor costs are fully deductible from the corporate tax base,
while capital costs are only partially deductible. For example, debt nancing costs
usually reduce the tax base, while equity nancing costs cannot be deducted. We
therefore assume that the MNE is allowed to deduct the share  2 [0;1[ of capital costs
from the tax base. The deductibility parameter  is the same for all countries and
exogenously given. This is a realistic assumption for many Formula Apportionment
systems, like the one in Germany and Canada or the proposed system in Europe, since
these systems use a common tax base denition.7 Denoting the wage rate in country
i by wi and the world interest rate by r, the MNE's tax base in country i reads
i = F(ki;`i)   rki   wi`i + si: (1)
The tax base of the MNE equals revenues reduced by the partially deductible capital
costs and the fully deductible labor costs and adjusted by prot shifting.
6This is a typical assumption in the above-mentioned literature on Separate Accounting versus
Formula Apportionment. All our main results also hold for the case of constant returns to scale
(m = 1), with slight changes in the notation of our analysis.
7An exception is Formula Apportionment in the US where each state uses its own tax base deni-
tion. But even in this system the denitions are not that dierent (e.g. Martens-Weiner, 2005).
6Each country is populated by a representative household who owns a xed capital
endowment k and a xed labor endowment `. The household earns income from inelas-
tically supplying these factor endowments on the world capital market and the local
labor market, respectively. Moreover, the household in country i owns a share i = 1=n
of the MNE and, thus, receives the share 1=n of the MNE's after-tax prots  as prot
income. The household uses its total income to buy the numeraire good. Denoting by
ci the quantity consumed, the budget constraint of the household in country i reads
ci = rk + wi` + i: (2)
In addition to the numeraire good, the household consumes the quantity gi of a (local)
public good provided by the local government. The utility of the household in country
i is represented by the quasi-concave utility function U(ci;gi).
The equilibrium on the world capital market requires that the MNE's aggregate
capital demand has to be equal to the households' aggregate capital supply, i.e.
n X
j=1
kj = nk: (3)
The local labor market in country i is in equilibrium if the MNE's labor demand in
this country equals the household's labor supply. Formally, we obtain
`i = `: (4)
Capital demand ki and labor demand `i inter alia depend on the factor prices r and
wi according the MNE's prot-maximization that we consider in detail below. Hence,
the factor prices r and wi are endogenously determined by the equations (3) and (4).
3 Separate Accounting
Behavior of the MNE. Under Separate Accounting, the MNE's prots are subject
to taxation in the country where they are declared. Denoting country j's statutory tax











The MNE maximizes its after-tax prots with respect to capital demand, labor demand
and prot shifting, taking as given the tax rates and the factor prices. In solving
7its maximization problem, the MNE takes into account the prot shifting constraint
Pn
j=1 sj = 0. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint by ,
the rst-order conditions of prot maximization are
(1   ti)[Fk(ki;`i)   r]   (1   )r = 0; (6)
F`(ki;`i)   wi = 0; (7)
(1   ti)   C0(si) +  = 0; (8)
with i 2 f1;:::;ng. Due to (6), capital is invested in country i up to the point where
the after-tax marginal returns equal marginal costs, taking into account deductibility
of capital costs. Equation (7) shows that the same is true with respect to labor input,
except for replacing the after-tax marginal returns by the before-tax marginal returns
since payroll is fully tax deductible. Finally, prots are shifted up to the point where
the marginal benets from saving taxes equal the marginal concealment costs, as shown
in (8). This condition together with
Pn
j=1 sj = 0 implies that the MNE shifts prots
from countries with above average tax rates to countries with below average tax rates.
The rst-order conditions (6){(8) together with the market clearing conditions (3)
and (4) determine capital input, labor input, wage rates and the interest rate in the
equilibrium of the factor markets. For later purposes, we have to identify the compar-
ative static eects of tax rate changes on the equilibrium values. We follow previous
studies on Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportionment and focus on the case
of full symmetry where countries impose the same tax rate ti = t for all i 2 f1;:::;ng.8
With identical tax rates in all countries we obtain ki = k, `i = `, wi = w, si = 0 and
i =  for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Totally dierentiating (6){(8) and then applying the





























8It may be argued that this is a restrictive assumption when discussing the implications of scal
equalization. But the basic incentive eects of equalization can be investigated also under symmetry.
Moreover, equalization with asymmetric countries has already been studied by DePater and Myers
(1994), K othenb urger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006). Hence, assuming symmetry helps to
work out the eects that the modeling of corporate taxation has for the incentive eects of equalization.
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C00 < 0; (12)
with i;j 2 f1;:::;ng and i 6= j. Reducing the tax rate in country i lowers capital
costs in this country. Hence, the MNE reallocates capital away from all other countries
to country i, as shown in equation (10). According to (9), the reallocation of capital
comes along with an increase in the interest rate. Because of the complementarity of
capital and labor (Fk` > 0), an increase (decline) in capital input increases (lowers) the
marginal returns to labor. Thus, the MNE has an incentive to raise labor demand in
country i and decrease labor demand in all other countries. Since labor input is xed
due to the labor market equilibrium condition (4), these changes in labor demand are
transformed into corresponding changes in the wage rates, as shown in (11). Finally,
equation (12) states that the fall in country i's tax rate induces the MNE to shift more
prots from the other countries to country i.
Tax competition. Having investigated the behavior of the MNE, we can now turn
to tax competition among the countries. The public budget constraint of country i
contains public expenditures gi, on the one hand, and corporate tax revenues tii, on
the other hand. In addition, we introduce a scal equalization system that inuences
the public budget constraint. More specic, country i's budget constraint contains
the expression T i(t) where t := (t1;:::;tn) is the vector of corporate tax rates of all
countries. If T i(t) is positive, it represents a transfer that country i receives. For
negative values of T i(t), country i has to pay a contribution. We assume
Pn
j=1 T j(t) =
0, so resources collected from one country are fully redistributed to other countries.
Taking into account the equalization system, country i's budget constraint reads
gi = tii + T
i(t): (13)
Country i sets its tax rate ti in order to maximize the utility of its representative
household, U(ci;gi), subject to the private and public budget constraints (2) and (13).
Moreover, it takes into account the eect of its tax rate on the factor market equilibrium
captured by (9){(12), but it takes as given the tax policy of all other countries. Hence,
we have a non-cooperative tax competition game among the n countries. The Nash
equilibrium of this game is determined by @U(ci;gi)=@ti = 0 for all i 2 f1;:::;ng.
As already mentioned above, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium with ti = t,
ki = k, `i = `, wi = w, si = 0 and i =  for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Using (9){
(12), it is straightforward to show that in the symmetric equilibrium the condition
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for i 6= j. The expressions in (15) are the pecuniary externalities caused by corporate
income taxation. They represent the eect of country i's tax rate on private income in
country j. A decrease in country i's tax rate raises capital and prot income in country
j (negative capital and prot income externalities CE and PE)9 and lowers wage income
in country j (positive wage income externality WE). Equation (16) contains the scal
externalities, i.e. the eect of country i's tax rate on country j's tax revenues. A
decrease in country i's tax rate changes the tax base net of prot shifting in country
j (positive or negative tax base externality TE) and reduces the tax base in country
j via a fall in prot shifting (positive prot shifting externality SE). In the absence
of scal equalization, the pecuniary and scal externalities determine the deviation of
the equilibrium tax rates from their Pareto-ecient (cooperative) level. Formally, this
can be seen by setting all externalities and T i
ti equal to zero in (14). We then obtain
Ug=Uc = 1 which is the Samuelson rule for the Pareto-ecient supply of the local public
good.10 It can be shown that the sign of the sum of all externalities is indeterminate.
Hence, it is not clear whether tax competition leads to inecient undertaxtion (sum of
externalities is positive) or inecient overtaxation (sum of externalities is negative). In
any case, the sum of externalities is zero only by chance and, thus, it can be expected
that without scal equalization tax competition leads to inecient tax rates.
Fiscal equalization. This ineciency result holds in the absence of scal equaliza-
tion. However, from (14) it becomes obvious that the equilibrium condition of the tax
9The sign of PE follows from using (7), (9) and the Euler Theorem mF = kFk+`F` in the denition
of PE in (15), so we obtain PE =  (1   m)F=n < 0.
10The appendix shows that the Samuelson rule really characterizes the Pareto-ecient (cooperative)
solution in our model.
10competition game coincides with the Samuleson rule if and only if
T
i
ti = (n   1)(CE + WE + PE + TE + SE): (17)
Hence, the scal equalization system can be used as a Pigouvian instrument to correct
for the ineciency caused by the non-cooperative tax policy. If the marginal transfer
of country i reects all externalities caused by country i's tax rate, then country i
internalizes the eects of its tax policy on all other countries. As a consequence, the
tax policy in the non-cooperative tax competition game is identical to the Pareto-
ecient (cooperative) tax policy characterized by the Samuelson rule.
This is qualitatively the same insight as the previous literature obtained in the
standard tax competition model with a unit tax on capital (e.g. DePater and Myers,
1994, K othenb urger, 2002, Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006). An important dierence is,
however, that the nature of externalities in our framework is dierent from that in
previous studies. This raises the question which type of equalization system satises
(17) and, thus, ensures that the non-cooperative tax policy becomes Pareto-ecient.
One candidate considered in the previous literature is the so-called Representative Tax
System (RTS) that aims at equalizing the dierence in a region's tax base relative to
that of a representative tax system. Under the RTS the transfer of country i reads
T
iB(t) =  t(    i); (18)
where   =
Pn




j=1 j is the
representative tax rate, i.e. the tax rate that yields the same tax revenues when applied
to the world tax base as the sum of regional tax revenues. The RTS is a central element
in the scal equalization system in Canada (Boadway, 2004; Smart, 2007), and also
equalization at the local level in Germany aims at equalizing tax bases (Buettner, 2006;
Egger et al., 2007). To illustrate the basic working of the RTS, it is useful to consider
a symmetric situation with identical tax bases. If country i tries to improve its tax
base by reducing its tax rate and if this reduction in the tax rate leaves unaltered the
average tax base, then the scal equalization system fully redistributes the increase in
country i's tax revenues back to the other countries. Hence, the net eect is zero and
country i looses the incentive to lower its tax rate.
Exactly for that reason, the RTS renders the non-cooperative tax policy in the
standard tax competition framework with symmetric countries and a xed capital
supply ecient (K othenb urger, 2002, Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006).11 In contrast,




j=1 @kj=@ti = 0
11in our framework the RTS is not able to restore eciency. Dierentiating (18) with
respect to ti, taking into account (1), (10){(12) and (16) and applying symmetry yields
T
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Comparing (19) with (17) immediately proves
Proposition 1. Suppose the non-cooperative tax competition game under Separate
Accounting attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, implementing a scal equal-
ization system of the RTS type [T i(t) = T iB(t) for i = 1;:::;n] does not ensure
Pareto-eciency of the non-cooperative tax rates.
The intuition of this result can best be explained with the help of (19). This equation
shows that the RTS does not internalize the pecuniary externalities CE, WE and PE.
The reason is obvious, since the RTS aims at equalizing the countries' tax bases, not
their private income. But even if we ignore this deciency, (19) reveals a further reason
for the failure of the RTS. Tax base equalization does not fully internalize the scal
externalities TE and SE. To understand this, suppose we start in a fully symmetric
situation where all countries have the same tax base. If country i now tries to improve
its tax base by reducing its tax rate, the transfer system redistributes the corresponding
increase in country i's tax revenues back to the other countries, see the expression
 t(@i=@ti) in (19). In contrast to the standard tax competition model, however, the
worldwide tax base
Pn
j=1 j falls, since the interest rate and thereby capital costs go up
in response to the tax rate decrease in country i.12 As a consequence, the average tax
base   falls and, thus, the redistribution system takes away from country i more than
the additional tax revenues. This eect is represented by the expression  t k(@r=@ti)
in (19). But even the increased transfer of country i is not enough to compensate the
other countries for their loss in tax revenues, since averaging implies that the fall in
the average tax base is smaller than the fall in the worldwide tax base. In sum, the
RTS internalizes only a part of the scal externalities as shown in (19).
At this point a remark on the countries' impact on the interest rate is in order. As
argued above, the RTS fails to fully internalize scal externalities because a decline in
country i's tax rate inuences the interest rate. One might therefore conjecture that
this failure of the RTS vanishes when countries are small so that their impact on the
follows TiB
ti =  t(@ki=@ti) = (n 1)t(@kj=@ti). The latter expression reects the scal externality. As
the pecuniary externalities sum up to zero, the RTS renders the non-cooperative tax policy ecient.
12Formally, using equations (10){(12) we obtain
Pn
j=1(@j=@ti) =  n k(@r=@ti) > 0.
12interest rate is negligible. But this is not true. Formally, the case of small countries
is reected by our model if the number of countries is large. If we let n converge to
innity, equation (9) shows that country i's impact on the interest rate really tends
to zero. However, the failure of the RTS to fully internalize scal externalities still
remains as shown by using n ! 1 in (19). Intuitively, the reason is that a decline in
country i's tax rate still lowers the worldwide tax base. For large n, country i's impact
on the interest rate and on the tax base of a single other country is small. But the
aggregate number of countries is large and, thus, the sum of tax bases of the other
countries still decreases. Hence, Proposition 1 and its interpretation also hold for the
case of small countries. The same will be true for all results derived below.
The failure of the RTS stated in Proposition 1 raises the question how to modify
the scal equalization system in order to ensure that the non-cooperative tax policy
becomes ecient. We discuss two modications. As the RTS fails to fully internalize
the scal externalities, we take a look at tax revenue equalization represented by
T
iR(t) = t   tii; (20)
where t =
Pn
j=1 tjj=n equals average tax revenues. Since the RTS ignores pecuniary
externalities, we additionally consider private income equalization given by
T
iP(t) =  c   ci; (21)
where  c =
Pn
j=1 cj=n represents average private income. Note that according to (2),
private income in country i equals private consumption ci.
Dierentiating equation (20) with respect to ti and taking into account (1), (10){
(12) and (16) yields
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iR


















Comparing (22) with (19) shows that tax revenue equalization triggers the same eects
as the RTS and is thereby characterized by the same deciencies as the RTS. But
there is now an additional eect reected by the expression  (n   1)=n in (22). To
understand this additional eect note that under tax revenue equalization the reduction
in country i's tax rate has a direct negative impact on country i's tax revenues and
on average tax revenues. Because of averaging, the loss in country i's tax revenues is
larger in absolute terms than the loss in average tax revenues. Hence, the direct eect
further reduces the net transfer of country i to the other countries and aggravates this
13deciency of the RTS. In terms of externalities, tax revenue equalization decreases the
part of scal externalities that is internalized, compared to the RTS.
Similarly, from (1), (2), (10){(12), (16) and (21) we obtain
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If country i reduces its tax rate, its private income is raised by an increase in capi-
tal, wage and prot income. This increase in private income is reected by the term
@ci=@ti in the rst line of (23). However, the increase via capital and prot income
is fully compensated by an equal increase in average private income reected by the
terms  k(@r=@ti) and (@=@ti)=n in the rst line of (23). What remains is the eect
via country i's wage income that the income equalization system redistributes to the
other countries and that is enough to compensate the other countries for the decline
in their wage income. But the other countries also benet from an increase in capital
and prot income and the income equalization system does not compensate for these
changes. In terms of externalities this means that private income equalization inter-
nalizes the positive wage income externality but not the negative capital and prot
income externalities, as shown in the second line of (23).
To sum up, implementing tax revenue equalization or private income equalization
separately does not remove the deciencies of the RTS. Private income equalization
internalizes only a part of the pecuniary externalities and tax revenue equalization
even worsens the internalization of scal externalities. An open question is, however,
whether combinations of the dierent equalization systems render the non-cooperative
tax policy Pareto-ecient. Combining private income equalization with tax revenue














Comparing with (17) immediately proves
Proposition 2. Suppose the non-cooperative tax competition game under Separate
Accounting attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then,
(i) implementing private income equalization and tax revenue equalization [T i(t) =
14T iP(t) + T iR(t) for all i = 1;:::;n] renders the non-cooperative tax rates ecient,
(ii) implementing private income equalization and the RTS [T i(t) = T iP(t) + T iB(t)
for all i = 1;:::;n] leads to ineciently high equilibrium tax rates.
The problem of income equalization is that it does not internalize the capital and
prot income externalities. Interestingly, these externalities just equal the part of
the scal externalities that is not internalized by tax revenue equalization.13 Hence,
the deciency of one of these equalization systems osets the deciency of the other
system and combining both systems renders the equilibrium tax rates Pareto-ecient,
as states in Proposition 2 (i). Under the RTS, in contrast, the deciency regarding the
internalization of scal externalities is not as severe as under tax revenue equalization.
Hence, combining RTS with the private income equalization redistributes too much
resources between the countries and thereby yields the countries an incentive to raise
the corporate tax rates above their ecient levels, as proven by Proposition 2 (ii).
4 Formula Apportionment
Behavior of the MNE. Under Formula Apportionment the tax bases of the MNE's
subsidiaries are consolidated. This gives the consolidated tax base
Pn
j=1 j which is
apportioned to the countries according to a certain formula. We consider the general
case in which the formula contains all three apportionment factors usually employed
in practice, that are the MNE's capital, sales and payroll shares. Denoting the weights
attached to these factors by ,  and ' with (;;') 2 [0;1]3 and  +  + ' = 1, the













where x i := (x1;:::;xi 1;xi+1;:::;xn) for x 2 fk;`;wg. The MNE's tax liability in
country i is tiAi()
Pn
j=1 j and its after-tax prots read
 = (1   )
n X
j=1

















13Formally, the term (n   1)[  + nt k(@r=@ti)]=n in equations (22) and (23) is equal to (n  
1)(CE + PE). This is straightforward to show by using equation (15).
15is the MNE's eective tax rate equal to the weighted average of all national tax rates.
The MNE maximizes after-tax prots (27). Since tax bases are consolidated, it is
not possible to lower the tax liability by shifting prots. For this reason the optimal
amount of prot shifting is zero in all countries, i.e. si = 0 for all i = 1;:::;n. The
















`i + (1   )[F`(ki;`i)   wi] = 0; (30)
for i = 1;:::;n. As under Separate Accounting, these conditions contain the after-tax
marginal returns to the input factors and the factor costs. But due to consolidation
and apportionment the after-tax marginal returns are now computed not with the help
of the national tax rates, but with the help of the eective tax rate . Moreover, (29)
and (30) are characterized by additional terms containing the derivatives of the appor-
tionment formula. These terms reect the MNE's formula manipulation incentive, i.e.
the incentive to increase investment and labor demand in low-tax countries in order to
increase the share of the consolidated tax base assigned to these countries.
To derive the comparative static eects of tax rate changes, we again focus on a
symmetric situation with ti = t, ki =  k, `i =  `, wi = w and i =  for all i = 1;:::;n.
Moreover, symmetry implies Ai = 1=n and
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16for i;j = 1;:::;n and i 6= j. These results are qualitatively the same as under Separate
Accounting, but the intuition is dierent. Under Separate Accounting the MNE reallo-
cates factor inputs to the tax-reducing country because this raises the tax base in this
country and lowers the tax bases in the other countries. Due to tax base consolidation,
this incentive is not present under Formula Apportionment. However, the tax rate
reduction in country i now induces the MNE to raise investment in country i and to
lower investment in all other countries since, by doing so, the MNE increases the share
of the consolidated tax base assigned to country i. The same is true with respect to
labor demand and, because labor supply in each country is xed, with respect to wage
rates. Formally, this intuition is conrmed by the fact that the eects in (35) and (36)
are non-zero only if one of the formula weights ,  or ' is positive.
Tax Competition. Under Formula Apportionment, tax revenues of country i read
tiAi()
Pn
j=1 j. Adding the transfer T i(t) of the scal equalization system, the public







The government of country i chooses its tax rate ti in order to maximize its resident's
utility U(ci;gi) subject to the private and public budget constraints (2) and (37). With
the help of (1), (27), (28) and (31){(36), it is straightforward to show that the Nash
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According to (38), the deviation of the non-cooperative tax policy from the Pareto-
ecient solution is again determined by the pecuniary and scal externalities. The
17pecuniary externalities in (39) are basically the same as under Separate Accounting.
The only dierence is that the wage income externality WE is now inuenced by the
formula, as can be seen by using (36) in WE. The scal externalities under Formula
Apportionment are represented by (40) and (41). In contrast to Separate Accounting,
the tax base externality TE is now unambiguously positive since it reects the eect
on the consolidated tax base, so changes in capital and wage rates cancel out and only
the change via the interest rate remains. Moreover, the prot shifting externality is
replaced by the formula externality FE, since under Formula Apportionment the MNE
shifts prots by manipulating apportionment shares instead of paper prots.
Fiscal Equalization. From (38) we see that the Nash equilibrium of the tax com-
petition game under Formula Apportionment is ecient if and only if
T
i
ti = (n   1)(CE + WE + PE + TE + FE): (42)
As under Separate Accounting, the transfer system under Formula Apportionment
plays a Pigouvian role. In order to render tax rates ecient, the marginal transfer of
country i has to internalize the externalities caused by this country's tax rate.
We start again by investigating whether the RTS satises this condition. Un-
der Formula Apportionment the relevant tax base of country i is given by c
i =
Ai Pn
j=1 j. The average tax base is the same as under Separate Accounting since
Pn












j. Under the RTS, the transfer of country i equals
T
iB(t) =  t(    
c
i): (43)
From (1), (35), (36), (40), (41), (43) and @Ai=@ti =  (n   1)(@Aj=@ti) follows
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Comparing (44) with (42) immediately proves
Proposition 3. Suppose the non-cooperative tax competition game under Formula
Apportionment attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, implementing a scal
equalization system of the RTS type [T i(t) = T iB(t) for i = 1;:::;n] does not ensure
Pareto-eciency of the non-cooperative tax rates.
The RTS ignores the pecuniary externalities and fails to fully internalize the scal
externalities. This is the same reasoning as for the failure of the RTS under Separate
18Accounting, but the story for the partial internalization of the scal externalities is
now dierent. Suppose country i reduces its tax rate and, by doing so, changes its tax
revenues. This change is represented by  t(@c
i=@ti) in the rst part of (44), and it is
caused by a reduction in the consolidated tax base and an increase in the share of the
consolidated tax base assigned to country i. In the RTS, the former eect is neutralized
by an equal fall in the average tax base, which is reected by  t k(@r=@ti) in the rst
part of (44). What remains is the increase in country i's share of the consolidated tax
base. This increase is fully redistributed to the other countries, so the other countries
are compensated for the decline in their shares of the consolidated tax base. But the
other countries also suer from the reduction in the consolidated tax base for which
the RTS does not compensate. Hence, the transfer taken from country i is too low, i.e.
the RTS reects the formula externality, but not the tax base externality.
As an alternative equalization system we again consider tax revenue equalization
and private income equalization. Average tax revenues can be written as tc =
Pn
j=1 tjc
j=n. Country i's transfer under tax revenue equalization therefore reads
T
iR(t) = tc   ti
c
i: (45)
Dierentiating (45) in the same way as (43) gives
T
iR



















Compared to the RTS, under tax revenue equalization a tax rate decrease in country i
additionally has a direct negative eect on average tax revenues and on tax revenues of
country i. This eect is represented by the term  (n   1)=n in (46). It is the reason
why the internalization of the scal externalities under tax revenue equalization is less
complete than under the RTS, as becomes obvious by comparing (44) and (46).
Private income is dened in the same way as under Separate Accounting, so the
transfer paid or received by country i under private income equalization is given by the
same expression as in (21). Moreover, the denitions of the private income externalities
under Formula Apportionment and Separate Accounting are also the same, as can be
seen from comparing equation (15) with equation (39). Hence, the analysis of private
income equalization under Formula Apportionment is qualitatively the same as under
Separate Accounting. That means, analogous to (23), we can show that private income
equalization internalizes the wage income externality WE, but fails to correct for the
capital and prot income externalities CE and PE, respectively.














Comparing with (42) proves
Proposition 4. Suppose the non-cooperative tax competition game under Formula
Apportionment attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then,
(i) implementing private income equalization and tax revenue equalization [T i(t) =
T iP(t) + T iR(t) for all i = 1;:::;n] renders the non-cooperative tax rates ecient,
(ii) implementing private income equalization and the RTS [T i(t) = T iP(t) + T iB(t)
for all i = 1;:::;n] leads to ineciently high equilibrium tax rates.
Private income equalization ignores the capital and prot income externalities. These
externalities are also the reason why tax revenue equalization does not fully internalize
the scal externalities. Hence, the drawbacks of both equalization systems just oset
each other and a combined private income and tax revenue equalization system en-
sures the ecient corporate tax policy under Formula Apportionment, as stated by
Proposition 4 (i). The degree of internalization of the scal externalities is larger un-
der the RTS than under tax revenue equalization. Combining the RTS with private
income equalization therefore implies too much internalization, so the non-cooperative
tax rates are ineciently high as shown by Proposition 4 (ii).
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 2, we see that a combination of private
income and tax revenue equalization ensures eciency, regardless of whether corporate
income taxation follows Separate Accounting or Formula Apportionment. As already
discussed in the Introduction, this result may help to mitigate the discussion on the
right taxation principle in the European Union. To see this, we have to take into
account that the combination of private income and tax revenue equalization is the
same as national income equalization and that there is already some redistribution
of national income in Europe via the EU budget. Of course, the EU budget does
not represent an equalization system as modeled in our formal analysis. But with
some caution we may at least argue that the existing income redistribution provides
a good basis for implementing an equalization system that inter alia accounts for
externalities caused by corporate income taxation in Europe. Perhaps a reform of
income redistribution is even easier to implement than a reform of the corporate tax
20system, since the former does not directly aect rms and households. In the same
sense we may argue that income redistribution in the US contributes to internalization
of externalities arising from corporate income taxation at the state level.
If national income equalization is not feasible, for example due to political rea-
sons, the question arises whether the RTS or tax revenue equalization performs better
in terms of eciency. This question is of particular importance under Formula Ap-
portionment since in Canada and Germany we observe the combination of Formula
Apportionment taxation and tax base equalization. Rewriting (44) and (46) to
T
iB






ti = (n   1)(FE + TE + CE + PE); (50)
and inserting into (38), it immediately follows
Proposition 5. Suppose the non-cooperative tax competition game under Formula
Apportionment attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, implementing a RTS
[T i(t) = T iB(t) for all i = 1;:::;n] is superior to implementing tax revenue equalization
[T i(t) = T iR(t) for all i = 1;:::;n], if WE > =n.
Proposition 5 identies WE > =n as a sucient condition for the superiority of the
RTS over tax revenue equalization under Formula Apportionment. As can be seen from
(49) and (50), both the RTS and tax revenue equalization do not internalize the wage
income externality represented by (n   1)WE. This externality is positive and points
to ineciently low tax rates in the equilibrium of the tax competition game. But the
RTS is characterized by a further distortion. It fails to exactly internalize the other
externalities. This failure is reected by the expression (n   1)=n > 0 in (49) and
points to too much internalization and too high equilibrium tax rates. Hence, it goes
into the other direction than the missing wage income externality. If WE > =n, the
wage income externality is the more severe distortion and the countries end up with
inecient undertaxation under both equalization systems. But the tax rates under the
RTS are then closer to their ecient levels than with tax revenue equalization.
Whether the condition WE > =n is satised depends inter alia on the shape of
the apportionment formula. Under a pure payroll formula we have  =  = 0 and
' = 1. Inserting into (36) and (39) implies WE > =n if and only if 1=(1 t) > 1. The
latter condition is always satised since t < 1. Hence, with a pure payroll formula the
wage income externality is suciently large and, in terms of eciency, the RTS always
outperforms tax revenue equalization. This insight supports the institutional setting
21at the local level in Germany where Formula Apportionment taxation of corporate
income employs a pure payroll formula. Hence, the implemented tax base equalization
is really more ecient than the alternative of tax revenue equalization
The implications for the Canadian case are less clear-cut. Corporate income taxa-
tion at the province level in Canada employs the Formula Apportionment principle with
a formula that uses payroll and sales with equal weights. For  = 0 and  = ' = 1=2
the condition WE > =n may or may not be satised. To illustrate, consider the
special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function F(ki;`i) = k
i `

i with ; 2]0;1[.
Inserting into (36) and (39) implies WE > =n if and only if 1+  > 2(1 t)(1 ).
Whether this latter condition is satised or not depends on the properties of the pro-
duction function and the equilibrium tax rate. The growth literature often supposes
constant returns to scale with  = 0:3 and  = 0:7 (e.g. Ortigueira and Santos, 1997,
Steger, 2005). The above condition is then equivalent to 1:4 > 1:4(1 t) and, thus, al-
ways satised according to t < 1. However, if we assume a xed production factor (like
land or natural resources) with a production share of 1       = 0:2 (e.g. Nordhaus
et al., 1992) and keep the assumption of  = 0:3, then the above condition becomes
t > 14:29%. As the corporate income tax rates of Canadian provinces currently lie
between 10% and 16%,14 it is no longer clear whether the condition WE > =n is
satised and the RTS is superior to tax revenue equalization. This problem becomes
the more severe the lower the production share of labor represented by .
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question whether pecuniary and scal externalities arising in
tax competition among countries can be internalized by scal equalization. The main
innovation of the analysis is that it explicitly models a corporate income tax and dis-
tinguishs dierent taxation principles, whereas previous studies interpreted corporate
taxation as a unit (wealth) tax on capital. In contrast to the previous literature, we can
show that, with symmetric countries and an exogenously given capital supply, tax base
equalization is not suitable to render non-cooperative tax rates Pareto-ecient. The
reason is that tax base equalization does not internalize the pecuniary externalities,
which in our framework are usually dierent from zero, and only partially internalizes
the scal externalities since a tax rate reduction in one country lowers the worldwide
14See http://www.kpmg.ca/en/services/tax/taxrates.html.
22tax base. Tax revenue equalization aggravates the latter problem, but combined with
private income equalization it just internalizes all externalities and ensures ecient tax
rates. These results hold for both taxation principles. If private income equalization is
not feasible under Formula Apportionment, then tax base equalization may be superior
to tax revenue equalization depending on the apportionment formula used.
Appendix
Proof of equations (9){(12). Totally dierentiating (6), taking into account (4)
and then applying the symmetry assumption yields
(1   t)Fkkdki   (Fk   r)dti   (1   t)dr = 0: (51)
From (3) we obtain
Pn




dti   n(1   t)dr = 0: (52)
To identify the comparative static eects of tax rates changes, we have to set all but
one dti equal to zero. This immediately proves (9). Using (9) in (51) and doing the
same for j instead of i yields (10). Form (7) and `i =  `, we obtain dwi = Fk`dki. Using
(10) in this relation proves (11). Finally, dierentiating (8) yields
 dti   C
00dsi + d = 0: (53)
Summing (53) over all countries and setting all but one dti equal to zero implies
d = 1=(ndti) since
Pn
i=1 si = 0 yields
Pn
i=1 dsi = 0. Using the expression for d
in (53) and taking into account
Pn
i=1 dsi = 0 proves (12). 
Pareto-ecient (cooperative) solution. We derive the Pareto-ecient (coopera-
tive) solution only for the tax regime of Separate Accounting. Since there are no regime
specic costs in our model, it follows from Coasean economics that the Pareto-ecient
solution under Formula Apportionment is exactly the same.
To characterize the cooperative solution, consider a social planner (e.g. a suprana-






U(r k + wj ` + =n;tjj); (54)
23where j, , r, kj and wj depend on the tax rates according to (1), (5) and (9){(12).

























From (1), (5) and (9){(12) we obtain
Pn
j=1 @wj=@ti = 0, @=@ti =     n(1  
t) k(@r=@ti) and
Pn
j=1 @j=@ti =  n k(@r=@ti). Inserting into (55) gives
Uc












and, thus, the Samuelson rule Ug=Uc = 1. 
Proof of equations (34){(36). Totally dierentiating (29) and (30), taking into












`i + (1   t)Fk`dki   (1   t)dwi = 0: (58)
Equation (28) and the symmetry assumption implies d =
Pn
j=1 dtj=n. Inserting into


















+ (1   t)dr
)
:(59)
If we sum up (59) over all i = 1;:::;n and take into account
Pn
i=1 dki = 0 from (3) as
well as
Pn
i=1[(n   1)dti  
Pn







Equation (34) follows from (60), if we set one dtj 6= 0 and all others equal to zero.
Inserting (60) back into (59) implies
@ki
@ti









Using (31) proves (35). Finally, from (58) we obtain































Using (61) and (32) proves (36). 
References
Baretti, C., Huber, B. and K. Lichtblau (2002), 'A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Eects
of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany', International Tax and Public Finance 9,
391-408.
Bayoumi, T. and P. Masson (1995), 'Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for
Monetary Union in Europe', European Economic Review 39, 253-274.
Boadway, R. (2004), 'The Theory and Practice of Equalization', CESifo Economic Studies 50, 211-
254.
Bucovetsky, S. and M. Smart (2006), 'The Eciency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization:
Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, Journal of Public Economic Theory 8, 119-44.
Buettner, T. (2006), 'The Incentive Eect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy', Journal
of Public Economics 91, 1533-54.
Dahlby, B., and N.A. Warren (2003), 'The Fiscal Incentive Eects of the Australian Equalisation
System', Economic Record 79, 434-445.
DePater, J.A. and G.M. Myers (1994), 'Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality
and a Corrective Devise', Journal of Urban Economics 36, 66-78.
Devereux, M.P. (2006), 'The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Prot: A
Survey of Empirical Evidence,' Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper
Series WP 07/02, Said Business School, Oxford.
Egger, P., K othenb urger, M. and M. Smart (2007), 'Do Fiscal Transfers Alleviate Business Tax
Competition? Evidence from Germany', CESifo Working Paper No. 1955, Munich.
Eggert, W. and G. Schjelderup (2003), 'Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment',
Journal of Public Economic Theory 5, 439-46.
Eichner, T. and M. Runkel (2008), 'Why the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment
with a Sales Factor', Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110, 567-89.
Eichner, T. and M. Runkel (2009), 'Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Unemploy-
ment', Regional Science and Urban Economics, forthcoming.
European Commission (2001), 'Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for
Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide Activities',
COM(2001), 582 nal (October 23).
European Commission (2007a), 'CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical Outline', Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, Working Paper 57, Brussels.
European Commission (2007b), 'CCCTB: Possible Elements of the Sharing Mechanism', Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, Working Paper 60, Brussels.
25Fenge, R. and M. Wrede (2007), 'EU Financing and Regional Policy: Vertical Fiscal Externalities
when Capital is Mobile', Finanzarchiv 63, 457-476.
Gordon, R.H. and J.D. Wilson (1986), 'An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income
Taxation under Formula Apportionment', Econometrica 54, 1357-73.
K othenb urger, M. (2002), 'Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization', International Tax and Public
Finance 9, 391-408.
Martens-Weiner, J. (2005), Company Tax Reform in the European Union, Springer.
M elitz, J. and F. Zumer (2002), 'Regional Redistribution and Stabilization by the Center in Canada,
France, the UK and the US: A Reassessment and New Tests', Journal of Public Economics 86,
263-286.
Nielsen, S.B., Raimondos-Mller, P. and G. Schjelderup (2003), 'Formula Apportionment and Trans-
fer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition', Journal of Public Economic Theory 5, 419-37.
Nielsen, S.B., Raimondos-Mller, P. and G. Schjelderup (2009), 'Company Taxation and Tax Spillovers:
Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportionment', European Economic Review, forthcom-
ing.
Nordhaus, W.D., Stavins, R.N. and M.L. Weitzman (1992), 'Lethal Model 2: The Limits of Growth
Reconsidered', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 2, 1-59.
Ortigueira, S. and M.S. Santos (1997), 'On the Speed of Convergence in Endogenous Growth Models,
American Economic Review 87, 383-399.
Pethig, R. and A. Wagener (2007), 'Prot Tax Competition and Formula Apportionment', Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance 14, 631-55.
Pinto, S.M. (2007), 'Corporate Prot Tax, Capital Mobility, and Formula Apportionment', Journal
of Urban Economics 62, 76-102.
Riedel, N. and M. Runkel (2007), 'Company Tax Reform with a Water's Edge', Journal of Public
Economics 91, 1533-54.
Smart, M. (1998), 'Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers', The
Canadian Journal of Economics 31, 189-206.
Smart, M. (2007), 'Raising Taxes through Equalization', Canadian Journal of Economics 40, 1188-
1212.
Sorensen, P.B. (2004), 'Company Tax Reform in the European Union', International Tax and Public
Finance 11, 91-115.
Steger, T.M. (2005), 'Welfare Implications of Non-Scale R&D-based Growth Models' Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 107, 737-757.
St owhase, S. and C. Traxler (2005), 'Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy', International
Tax and Public Finance 12, 515-531.
Traxler, C. and A. Reutter (2008), 'Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization and Decentralized Tax
Enforcement', Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn
2008/21, Bonn.
Wellisch, D. (2004), 'Taxation under Formula Apportionment - Tax Competition, Tax Incidence,
and the Choice of Apportionment Factors', Finanzarchiv 60, 24-41.
Wildasin, D.E. (1989), 'Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective
Subsidy', Journal of Urban Economics 25, 193-212.
26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2685 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg and Hannes Winner, Incorporation and Taxation: 
Theory and Firm-level Evidence, June 2009 
 
2686 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis, Timing of Technology Adoption and 
Product Market Competition, June 2009 
 
2687 Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong and Jérémie Lefebvre, An Empirical Analysis of Legal 
Insider Trading in the Netherlands, June 2009 
 
2688 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman M. Sheremeta, An Experimental 
Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, June 2009 
 
2689 Alexander Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Weak and Strong Cross 
Section Dependence and Estimation of Large Panels, June 2009 
 
2690 Mohamed El Hedi Arouri and Christophe Rault, On the Influence of Oil Prices on Stock 
Markets: Evidence from Panel Analysis in GCC Countries, June 2009 
 
2691 Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Political Stability and Fiscal Policy – Time 
Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849, June 2009 
 
2692 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual 
Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth, June 2009 
 
2693 Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann, Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of 
Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000, June 2009 
 
2694 Kirsten Wandschneider and Nikolaus Wolf, Shooting on a Moving Target: Explaining 
European Bank Rates during the Interwar Period, June 2009 
 
2695 J. Atsu Amegashie, Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, June 2009 
 
2696 Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, War and Relatedness, June 2009 
 
2697 Steven Brakman, Charles van Marrewijk and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market 
Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market – the Importance of Capacity 
Constraints and Efficiency Differences, July 2009 
 
2698 Huifang Tian, John Whalley and Yuezhou Cai, Trade Sanctions, Financial Transfers 
and BRIC’s Participation in Global Climate Change Negotiations, July 2009 
 
2699 Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer, Government Decentralization as a Disincentive 
for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis, July 2009 
  
2700 Balázs Égert, Tomasz Koźluk and Douglas Sutherland, Infrastructure and Growth: 
Empirical Evidence, July 2009 
 
2701 Felix Bierbrauer, Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large 
Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty, July 2009 
 
2702 Marc Gronwald, Investigating the U.S. Oil-Macroeconomy Nexus using Rolling 
Impulse Responses, July 2009 
 
2703 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Government Deficits in the European Union: An Analysis 
of Entry and Exit Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2704 Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, July 
2009 
 
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009 
 
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
  
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
 
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
 
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009 
 
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
  
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
 
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 